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Low 32 Bitcoin

feat(tron): Adding FreezeBalanceV2 contract logic

TZ870f0db1 View source ↗
Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by PrisionMike

72/100 · Adequate
feat(tron): Adding FreezeBalanceV2 contract logic

- Main logic for Staking Tron for energy or bandwidth.
- Scaffolding in preceding commit.

[no changelog]
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Provides an explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit adds support for a new Tron blockchain operation called FreezeBalanceV2, which lets users stake TRX tokens to gain Energy or Bandwidth. The change is a feature addition: it adds the contract type to the list of supported transactions, shows the user a confirmation screen with the staking amount and resource type, and handles a protocol quirk where the default resource value must be omitted when serializing the transaction. There is no direct evidence in the commit of a security vulnerability, but any new signing path deserves careful review.

Recommended action

Review the new signing path for correct proto3 serialization, ensure frozen_balance bounds are validated, verify the UI accurately reflects the transaction being signed, and confirm that the BANDWIDTH default-stripping logic cannot be abused to produce an ambiguous or malicious transaction hash.

Security signals we found

01

New transaction signing path added for Tron FreezeBalanceV2Contract

02

UI confirmation required before signing, with hold-to-confirm for staking summary

03

Default-value stripping for proto3 BANDWIDTH resource to ensure correct transaction hash

04

No input validation shown for frozen_balance beyond existing int64 checks

05

Test fixtures include both Energy and Bandwidth staking cases

Risk score

Why this scored 32/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 5/30
Exploitability 5/25
Stealth signal 5/15
Affected reach 5/15
Confidence 8/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

Community notes

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