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Low 30 Bitcoin

chore: enable SLIP-24 for ERC-20 `transfer`

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Ioan Bizău

57/100 · Thin
chore: enable SLIP-24 for ERC-20 `transfer`

[no changelog]
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit enables Trezor hardware wallets to use SLIP-24 payment requests when signing ERC-20 token transfers. Previously, payment requests were rejected for any contract interaction, including ERC-20 transfers. The change adds a new code path that verifies the token transfer amount and recipient against a signed payment request before showing the confirmation screen. It is a feature-enablement change rather than a fix for an active vulnerability, but it touches security-critical signing flow code.

Recommended action

Review the new payment-request path for ERC-20 transfers to ensure `payment_request_verifier.add_output()` receives the correct raw amount and recipient, that `verify()` failures are handled safely, and that the UI flow cannot be bypassed. Verify that removing the blanket contract-interaction rejection does not open other contract-call types to payment-request misuse. Consider whether `assert data_length == 0` is appropriate for production security assumptions or should be an explicit error.

Security signals we found

01

Feature enablement for SLIP-24 payment requests on ERC-20 `transfer` calls

02

Removal of blanket rejection of payment requests for contract interactions

03

Addition of payment-request verification path inside ERC-20 transfer handler

04

Use of `assert` for control-flow assumptions (`assert data_length == 0`)

05

Change to security-critical transaction confirmation flow

Risk score

Why this scored 30/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 5/30
Exploitability 5/25
Stealth signal 5/15
Affected reach 5/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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