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Low 35 Bitcoin

feat(core/prodtest): implement tropic prodtest

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Ondřej Vejpustek

57/100 · Thin
feat(core/prodtest): implement tropic prodtest
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit adds production-test commands for a new Tropic security chip in Trezor hardware wallets. It also finishes a previously stubbed secure-channel encryption routine and adds commands to read/write device certificates and keys. The changes are intended for the factory-provisioning environment (prodtest), not the end-user firmware, but they handle real cryptographic keys and chip configuration. There is no direct evidence of a vulnerability, but the code touches sensitive key material and includes hard-coded test keys and TODOs, so it warrants careful review.

Recommended action

Treat this as a high-sensitivity factory-provisioning change that should undergo focused security review before use in production. Verify that hard-coded keys are only for emulator/testing builds and are not compiled into production prodtest binaries. Confirm the Tropic access-control matrices in `irreversible_configuration` and `reversible_configuration` match the intended least-privilege model, and ensure `tropic-lock` cannot be triggered accidentally or maliciously on already-deployed devices. Review the secure-channel key provisioning flow so the HSM public key is not static in source. Finally, complete the TODOs (serial-number verification, FIDO certificate chain validation) before relying on this code for production provisioning.

Security signals we found

01

Hard-coded cryptographic keys in source (factory pairing private keys for emulator/testing/production)

02

Previously stubbed secure-channel encryption now activated

03

Commands that read/write device attestation private keys and certificates

04

Irreversible Tropic chip configuration command (`tropic-lock`)

05

Raw passthrough commands (`tropic-handshake`, `tropic-send-command`) to a security chip

06

TODO comments indicating configuration and key handling are not final

07

Production-test code paths that could persist secrets to flash (`secret_key_set`, `secret_write`)

Risk score

Why this scored 35/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 8/30
Exploitability 7/25
Stealth signal 6/15
Affected reach 5/15
Confidence 6/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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