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Low 31 Bitcoin

feat(core): add N4W1 backup/recovery flows

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Roman Zeyde

90/100 · Strong
feat(core): add N4W1 backup/recovery flows

Can be manually tested by invoking:
```
$ core/emu.py -ea -c trezorctl device setup -b shamir # will run multi-share backup
$ core/tools/n1w1-emu.py run 127.0.0.1:21325 /tmp/tagN # simulate tag connection and I/O
```

Enabled N4W1-based backup/recovery device tests for SLIP-39 single group scenarios.
Other device & click tests will be added in subsequent PRs.

[no changelog]
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit adds a new backup and recovery method called N4W1 to Trezor firmware. It is a feature addition that lets users back up and restore their wallet seed using a near-field wireless tag instead of typing words on the device screen. The change is mostly about adding new code paths and tests; it does not appear to fix a known security bug, nor does the vendor describe it as a security patch.

Recommended action

Treat as a normal feature commit. If reviewing for security, focus on the N4W1 I/O path: verify that tag read/write is authenticated, that the mnemonic blob is encrypted in transit, that the device confirms tag presence before writing, and that the debug mock cannot be enabled in production builds. No immediate patching is indicated by this commit alone.

Security signals we found

01

New backup/recovery surface introduced (N4W1 tag I/O)

02

Conditional compilation/build flag `USE_N4W1` / `N4W1` added to CI

03

Debug-link mock used for N4W1 I/O in tests (`apps.debug.n4w1_mock`)

04

Existing SLIP-39/BIP39 validation reused for N4W1 recovery shares

05

No vendor statement of security relevance or CVE in commit message

06

No independent researcher attribution in commit or vendor material

Risk score

Why this scored 31/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 5/30
Exploitability 5/25
Stealth signal 5/15
Affected reach 5/15
Confidence 8/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

Community notes

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