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Low 27 Bitcoin

chore(core/eckhart): do not disable partially hidden items

TZ4862cc9d View source ↗
Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Lukas Bielesch

77/100 · Adequate
chore(core/eckhart): do not disable partially hidden items

- rather limit their touch area not to overlap with the top component
[no changelog]
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Provides an explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit tweaks how menu buttons behave on the Trezor Safe 5 (Eckhart layout). Previously, any menu button that was not fully visible on screen was completely disabled, so you could not tap it. Now only buttons that are fully hidden are disabled; buttons that are partially visible remain active, but their touchable area is trimmed so it does not overlap the top header. This is a user-interface polish change, not a fix for a cryptographic or firmware security flaw. It could slightly reduce the chance of a user accidentally tapping a half-hidden button, but it does not introduce or remove a meaningful security vulnerability on its own.

Recommended action

Treat as a normal UI behavior update. No security patch or incident response is indicated. If reviewing for release, verify that the updated UI test fixtures cover partially-hidden menu items and that the touch-area shrink logic does not leave unintended active regions outside the visible button bounds.

Security signals we found

01

UI touch-area clipping change for partially visible menu items

02

No changes to cryptography, secure storage, protocol parsing, or authentication

03

No mention of vulnerability, CVE, or security fix in commit message

04

Test fixture hashes updated, indicating expected screen/touch behavior changed

05

Change is scoped to a single UI layout (Eckhart / T3W1)

Risk score

Why this scored 27/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 4/30
Exploitability 3/25
Stealth signal 5/15
Affected reach 6/15
Confidence 6/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

Community notes

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