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Low 35 Bitcoin

feat(core): SLIP-24 payment requests for Cardano

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Ioan Bizău

57/100 · Thin
feat(core): SLIP-24 payment requests for Cardano

[no changelog]
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit adds a new feature to Trezor hardware wallets: SLIP-24 payment requests for Cardano transactions. It lets a merchant or service provider attach a signed payment request to a Cardano transaction, which the device then displays to the user for confirmation. The change is a feature addition, not a documented security fix. It includes a restriction that payment requests can only be used with single-output transactions, and it reuses an existing payment-request verification framework already present in the firmware.

Recommended action

Review the integration of `PaymentRequestVerifier` with Cardano outputs to ensure the verifier's assumptions (e.g., output ordering, change detection, amount matching) hold for Cardano's transaction structure. Confirm that the single-output restriction is sufficient and cannot be bypassed through output chunking or nested change outputs. Validate that the UI correctly distinguishes payment-request transactions from normal ones to prevent user confusion.

Security signals we found

01

New protobuf field marked experimental: `payment_req` in `CardanoSignTxInit`

02

Payment request verification delegated to existing `apps.common.payment_request.PaymentRequestVerifier`

03

Guard added: multiple outputs rejected when a payment request is present

04

User confirmation flow added via `require_confirm_payment_request`

05

SLIP-21 keychain passed into Cardano signer for payment-request signature verification

06

No changelog entry; commit is labeled as a feature

Risk score

Why this scored 35/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 8/30
Exploitability 6/25
Stealth signal 5/15
Affected reach 7/15
Confidence 6/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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