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Informational 24 Monero

Spark: add address ownership proof signing and verification

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Navid Rahimi

60/100 · Adequate
Spark: add address ownership proof signing and verification
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Mentions testing or verification! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit adds a new feature to Stack Wallet that lets Spark (Firo privacy) address owners prove they control an address, and lets others verify that proof. It also fixes a few related UI issues: view-only wallets can now only verify (not sign) Spark proofs, pasted messages keep exact spaces/newlines instead of being trimmed, and the signing/verification screens scroll properly on desktop. There is no direct evidence in the commit that this fixes an active security vulnerability; it reads as a feature addition with some hardening improvements.

Recommended action

Review the implementation of createSparkAddressOwnershipProof in the updated flutter_libsparkmobile dependency (commit 3fdcb21160a39c051a0e73d7ae04f987134ecd5f) to confirm it uses the correct Spark private key and does not leak key material. Also verify that the proof format is non-malleable and that verification rejects testnet/mainnet mismatches. The UI hardening changes look sensible but should be regression-tested on view-only wallets.

Security signals we found

01

New cryptographic signing/verification API integrated into wallet

02

View-only wallet restriction added to prevent signing with private keys

03

Whitespace preservation in pasted messages reduces signature/verification mismatch risk

04

Dependency bump on flutter_libsparkmobile to commit 3fdcb21160a39c051a0e73d7ae04f987134ecd5f

05

No explicit security advisory, CVE, or vulnerability description in commit or references

Risk score

Why this scored 24/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 4/30
Exploitability 3/25
Stealth signal 2/15
Affected reach 5/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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