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Moderate 53 Monero

refactor(mwc): keep wallet handle in instance var, not secure storage

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by sneurlax

77/100 · Adequate
refactor(mwc): keep wallet handle in instance var, not secure storage

chore(mwc): trim comments around wallet-handle refactor
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Provides an explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit refactors how Stack Wallet stores the live Mimblewimblecoin (MWC) wallet handle. Previously, the app saved a process-scoped Rust pointer in secure storage, which could be reused after an app restart and cause crashes or memory corruption. Now the handle is kept only in memory for the current process, and stale pointers are deleted from secure storage. The change reduces the risk of crashes and undefined behavior, but it is a defensive refactor rather than a confirmed remote exploit fix.

Recommended action

Treat this as a worthwhile hardening change. Review whether any other wallets or FFI wrappers persist process-local pointers in secure storage or shared preferences. Verify that `_ensureWalletOpen()` is called consistently before every FFI use and that the stale-key deletion covers upgrade paths from older builds. No urgent patch deployment is indicated absent evidence of active exploitation.

Security signals we found

01

Process-scoped Rust pointer was persisted to secure storage and reused across launches

02

Old code deleted stale pointer only conditionally; new code always deletes stale `${walletId}_wallet` before opening

03

Multiple call sites moved from direct secure-storage reads to `_ensureWalletOpen()`

04

Commit message and removed comments describe SIGSEGV/dangling-pointer risk

05

No CVE, advisory, or researcher attribution present in commit or supplied references

Risk score

Why this scored 53/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 18/30
Exploitability 8/25
Stealth signal 6/15
Affected reach 10/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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