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Low 30 Monero

firo temp SIST

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Julian

8/100 · Opaque
firo temp SIST
✓ Subject identifies a change! No meaningful explanatory body! Contains work-in-progress language
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit changes how the Stack Wallet mobile app handles private Firo (Spark) transactions. It temporarily blocks sending private Firo funds to exchange addresses, and rewrites the internal logic for preparing and broadcasting Spark spends so that each transaction uses only a single Spark coin input. It also adds a new planner that can split one payment across multiple single-input transactions when needed. The change appears to be a defensive measure rather than a fix for an active exploit, but it touches sensitive transaction-building code and removes some previously available functionality.

Recommended action

Treat this as a high-priority change in transaction-critical code. Review the new planner's edge cases (dust outputs, fee changes between planning and signing, partial broadcast failures), ensure the single-input enforcement cannot be bypassed, and verify that the temporary exchange restriction is clearly communicated to users. Regression testing should cover multi-coin Spark balances, send-all flows, Spark name registrations, and exchange sends.

Security signals we found

01

Temporary disabling of private Firo sends to exchange addresses

02

New single-input-per-transaction enforcement for Spark spends

03

Sequential broadcast with partial-send failure handling

04

Addition of transaction planning limits (max transactions, max weight, max private recipients, max transparent amount)

05

Validation that each Spark coin is used by at most one transaction

06

Changes to fee estimation and balance-checking logic for Spark coins

Risk score

Why this scored 30/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 8/30
Exploitability 3/25
Stealth signal 4/15
Affected reach 6/15
Confidence 6/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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