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Low 34 Monero

Add support for creating Firo masternodes.

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by cassandras-lies

45/100 · Thin
Add support for creating Firo masternodes.
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit adds a new feature to Stack Wallet that lets Firo cryptocurrency users create and manage masternodes directly from the app. A masternode is a special server that helps run the Firo network and requires locking up 1,000 FIRO as collateral. The change adds new screens, wallet logic, and transaction-building code to support this. It is a feature-add commit, not a stated security fix, but it touches sensitive areas like transaction construction, address validation, and balance checks.

Recommended action

Treat this as a high-risk feature addition requiring focused review and testing before release. Specifically: (1) audit the byte-level serialization in `registerMasternode()` against the Firo DIP-3/DIP-6 provider-registration transaction spec, (2) verify `overrideVersion` encoding is accepted by Firo consensus and ElectrumX servers, (3) test edge cases in address validation, operator reward bounds, and IP/port parsing, (4) ensure the 10x fee heuristic cannot overpay or underpay in realistic network conditions, (5) review `getMyMasternodeProTxHashes()` false-positive handling so users are not misled, and (6) run integration tests on testnet/mainnet with real protx broadcasts. No immediate patch is indicated because no vulnerability is proven from the diff alone.

Security signals we found

01

New transaction serialization path with custom byte-level payload construction in `registerMasternode()`

02

Use of `overrideVersion` to set a non-standard transaction version (3 + (1 << 16))

03

Custom `vExtraData` passed into coinlib transaction builder

04

Address validation is performed on owner, voting, and payout addresses before use

05

Balance threshold check requires at least 1000 FIRO spendable before registration

06

Hard-coded fee multiplier (`defaultFeeRate * 10`) chosen because coin selection heuristic does not account for vExtraData size

07

Inputs hash computed via double SHA-256 over reversed txid bytes and little-endian vout

08

Commented assumptions and known limitations in `getMyMasternodeProTxHashes()` (e.g., false positives for 1000 FIRO UTXOs, shared-seed edge cases)

09

No explicit security disclosure, CVE, or researcher attribution in commit or supplied references

Risk score

Why this scored 34/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 8/30
Exploitability 7/25
Stealth signal 4/15
Affected reach 6/15
Confidence 6/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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