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Informational 16 Monero

feat: add prepareOrdinalSend to ordinals interface

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by sneurlax

62/100 · Adequate
feat: add prepareOrdinalSend to ordinals interface

w a single input send-all
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit adds a new helper function for sending Bitcoin ordinals (special NFT-like assets). It builds a transaction that spends only the single ordinal coin and sends it to a recipient. The change temporarily unblocks a 'blocked' ordinal UTXO so the wallet's coin selection will accept it, then re-blocks it afterward. There is no obvious security bug in the diff, but the code touches sensitive areas: coin control, blocked UTXO state, fee handling, and ordinal preservation. The safety of the function depends heavily on whether the underlying prepareSend correctly handles a single-input send-all and does not accidentally add extra inputs or change outputs that could split or lose the ordinal.

Recommended action

Review the implementation of prepareSend and the coin-selection/fee-construction code to confirm that: (1) only the provided ordinal UTXO is used as input, (2) no change output is added, (3) the recipient receives exactly one output, (4) the fee is deducted from the UTXO value without breaking FIFO ordinal assignment, and (5) the temporary unblock/reblock cannot race with other wallet operations. Consider adding explicit tests for ordinal send-all behavior and failure paths.

Security signals we found

01

UTXO blocking/unblocking logic around sensitive ordinal assets

02

Single-input send-all transaction construction for ordinals

03

Reliance on FIFO ordering to preserve ordinal assignment

04

Use of ignoreCachedBalanceChecks=true

05

No explicit change-output suppression visible in the diff

Risk score

Why this scored 16/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 2/30
Exploitability 2/25
Stealth signal 1/15
Affected reach 3/15
Confidence 6/10
Evidence quality 2/5
Human-validated context

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