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Informational 24 Monero

unreviewed

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Julian

0/100 · Opaque
unreviewed
! Very short subject! Too few words to establish purpose! No meaningful explanatory body! Opaque security-relevant change
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit is a large UI refactor of the Stack Wallet 'ShopInBit' payment flow. It extracts duplicated payment-method selection and QR-code dialogs into a shared widget, fixes some navigation bugs after a payment is sent, and tightens the USDT Ethereum-address detection. There is no obvious new security vulnerability in the diff, but the change is substantial and unreviewed, so it could contain subtle bugs.

Recommended action

Treat this as a normal but large feature/bugfix refactor. Have it code-reviewed by someone familiar with the ShopInBit flow, focusing on: (1) correct desktop/mobile navigation popping after a send, (2) that the new `ShopInBitPaymentMethodList` still disables payment actions when `_payNowEnabled` is false, (3) that removing `amountFallback` does not break invoices where the amount is only in `PaymentInfo.due`, and (4) that the stale-request guard covers all async callbacks. No immediate security patch is indicated by the diff alone.

Security signals we found

01

Large refactor (+490/-489) with no security explanation in commit message

02

Navigation logic changed in confirm-send flow; incorrect pop behavior could strand users on a sensitive screen

03

USDT Ethereum URI detection tightened to require an Ethereum address in the URI path, reducing risk of misrouting TRC20/USDT payments

04

Stale async response guard added via `_paymentRequestId` to prevent late poll results from overwriting current payment state

05

Amount parsing no longer falls back to `_paymentInfo?.due`, so send amount now strictly derives from the payment URI

Risk score

Why this scored 24/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 4/30
Exploitability 3/25
Stealth signal 3/15
Affected reach 5/15
Confidence 6/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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