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Moderate 61 Bitcoin

check a proof that does not reconstruct against the server chain before reporting it, as a server can report a transaction on a branch before announcing its tip

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Craig Raw

50/100 · Thin
check a proof that does not reconstruct against the server chain before reporting it, as a server can report a transaction on a branch before announcing its tip
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit fixes a bug in how Sparrow Wallet checks Bitcoin transaction proofs from an Electrum server. Previously, if a server had switched to a different blockchain branch (for example due to a reorganization) but had not yet announced the new tip, Sparrow could wrongly reject valid proofs as false. The fix makes Sparrow reconcile its stored block headers with the server's chain before marking a proof as failed. This reduces the chance of a server tricking the wallet into thinking a real transaction is unconfirmed or on the wrong chain, which could affect balance display or trust decisions.

Recommended action

Review the reconciliation logic to ensure it cannot be abused to accept invalid proofs on a malicious server-controlled chain. Confirm that getReconciledHeader() properly validates the server's chain against proof-of-work and that the fallback to failedProofs remains safe when reconciliation fails. Consider whether additional logging or user notification is warranted when the wallet follows a server onto a previously unknown branch.

Security signals we found

01

Merkle proof verification bypass/relaxation under reorganization window

02

Server-side blockchain state synchronization before proof validation

03

Risk of false-negative proof rejection leading to incorrect transaction confirmation status

04

Electrum server chain reconciliation added to header store

Risk score

Why this scored 61/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 18/30
Exploitability 12/25
Stealth signal 10/15
Affected reach 10/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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