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Low 27 Bitcoin

resend batch requests that have been skipped as making the batch response too large, so a large wallet history page syncs instead of failing every refresh

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Craig Raw

50/100 · Thin
resend batch requests that have been skipped as making the batch response too large, so a large wallet history page syncs instead of failing every refresh
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit fixes a wallet-sync reliability problem. When Sparrow asked an Electrum server for a large batch of transaction history data, some servers would skip part of the request because the answer would be too big. Previously those skipped requests were treated as failures, so a large wallet's history page could never finish refreshing. The change detects the 'response too large' signal from Frigate and ElectrumX servers and automatically re-sends the skipped items in smaller batches until they succeed or truly fail for another reason. It is a robustness improvement, not a typical security bug fix.

Recommended action

Treat as a normal reliability/bug-fix commit. Reviewers should verify that the resend recursion cannot be abused by a hostile or misconfigured Electrum server to cause excessive client-side network load, and confirm the fresh-id logic does not break idempotency assumptions elsewhere in the RPC layer. No urgent security patch is indicated.

Security signals we found

01

Error-code parsing now distinguishes server capacity signals from real request errors

02

Recursive resend with fresh request ids could, in theory, hide a malicious server's behavior if an attacker-controlled server repeatedly returns RESPONSE_TOO_LARGE for a subset of requests

03

No input validation changes; the patch only changes batch retry logic

04

No cryptographic, authentication, or privacy changes visible in the diff

Risk score

Why this scored 27/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 5/30
Exploitability 2/25
Stealth signal 3/15
Affected reach 6/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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