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High 73 Bitcoin

verify wallet input signatures of unconfirmed transactions before adding them to the wallet history

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Craig Raw

60/100 · Adequate
verify wallet input signatures of unconfirmed transactions before adding them to the wallet history
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Mentions testing or verification! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit adds a security check in the Sparrow bitcoin wallet. When the wallet connects to an external Electrum-style server, the server can tell the wallet about unconfirmed transactions that appear to spend from the wallet. Before this change, the wallet would add those transactions to its history without checking whether they were actually signed by the wallet's own keys. A dishonest or compromised server could therefore make the wallet believe money was spent or received when it really wasn't. The new code verifies the signatures on any unconfirmed transaction that spends from the wallet, and if the signatures are invalid, the transaction is kept out of the wallet history and the user is warned.

Recommended action

Users should upgrade to a Sparrow release containing this commit. After upgrading, when using public or third-party Electrum servers, the wallet will now reject server-reported unconfirmed spends that are not properly signed and will alert the user. Users who see the new 'Invalid Transaction' dialog should switch to a different, trusted server or use a local Bitcoin Core node. Developers should review the drongo submodule bump for any related API or behavior changes in wallet.getUnsignedInputs() and wallet.getSigningNodes().

Security signals we found

01

New signature-verification gate for unconfirmed spends before wallet history update

02

Removal of invalidly-signed unconfirmed transactions and their descendants from wallet state

03

User-visible warning when server reports unsigned spends from the wallet

04

Taproot-specific fetching of spent parent transactions to validate signature commitments

05

Per-session deduplication of warnings (unsignedWarnedTxids) with reset on server change

06

Skip verification when connected to local Bitcoin Core (trusted full node)

07

Large test suite added demonstrating attack scenarios (altered outputs, fake child transactions, payjoin-like taproot cases)

Risk score

Why this scored 73/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 22/30
Exploitability 16/25
Stealth signal 11/15
Affected reach 12/15
Confidence 8/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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