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Moderate 59 Bitcoin

sum the swept key once per input when sweeping to a silent payment address, and refuse silent payment sweeps from uncompressed keys

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Craig Raw

50/100 · Thin
sum the swept key once per input when sweeping to a silent payment address, and refuse silent payment sweeps from uncompressed keys
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit fixes two bugs in Sparrow Wallet's feature that lets users sweep old private keys into a 'silent payment' address. First, when multiple transaction outputs were being swept, the wallet was incorrectly using the same private key once instead of mathematically combining it once per input, which would produce the wrong silent payment address and likely make the funds unspendable or send them to an address no one controls. Second, the wallet now blocks sweeping from uncompressed private keys into silent payments, because silent payments require compressed keys to work correctly. The commit is a bug fix rather than an exploit against users, but the underlying flaw could have caused loss of funds if a user tried a multi-input silent-payment sweep.

Recommended action

Users who attempted to sweep multiple outputs from a private key into a silent payment address before this fix should verify whether the resulting transaction was broadcast and, if so, whether the funds are recoverable. Upgrading to the fixed version is recommended. Developers should add tests covering multi-input silent-payment sweeps and compressed/uncompressed key validation.

Security signals we found

01

Funds-loss bug in silent-payment sweep with multiple inputs

02

Incorrect scalar handling for per-input key aggregation

03

Missing key-format validation for silent payment sender

04

Patch is narrowly scoped to a single dialog class

Risk score

Why this scored 59/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 18/30
Exploitability 12/25
Stealth signal 8/15
Affected reach 10/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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