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Low 42 Bitcoin

compare multisig cosigner xpubs by public key and chain code when checking for duplicate keystores

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Craig Raw

50/100 · Thin
compare multisig cosigner xpubs by public key and chain code when checking for duplicate keystores
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit changes how Sparrow Wallet detects duplicate cosigner keys in multisig wallets. Previously it compared extended public keys (xpubs) using a full equality check, which may have treated xpubs with different metadata (such as different derivation paths or master fingerprints) as different even when they represented the same underlying public key. Now it compares only the raw public key and chain code. This could prevent a user from accidentally adding the same cosigner twice, or conversely could help catch cases where the same key is disguised with different xpub metadata. The commit itself does not explain whether this fixes a security bug or is just a robustness improvement.

Recommended action

Review the drongo submodule commit 499a656b0fb0aaed701aa4d32702a3c32818c813 to confirm hasSameKey() compares exactly the public key and chain code and does not introduce any new collisions or bypasses. If this change is intended to fix a security issue, request a CVE and advisory from the vendor. Users relying on multisig should ensure they are on the patched version and verify cosigner xpubs manually until then.

Security signals we found

01

Change in identity/equality semantics for cryptographic public material

02

Multisig cosigner duplicate detection logic

03

Submodule update likely contains the substantive implementation change

04

No explicit security framing in commit title or message

Risk score

Why this scored 42/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 12/30
Exploitability 8/25
Stealth signal 7/15
Affected reach 6/15
Confidence 6/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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