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Moderate 58 Bitcoin

keep the encrypted master secret of imported slip39 shares, so that the wallet decrypts it with any passphrase as the shares do

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Craig Raw

62/100 · Adequate
keep the encrypted master secret of imported slip39 shares, so that the wallet decrypts it with any passphrase as the shares do
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Explains rationale or failure mode! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit fixes how Sparrow Wallet stores the backup/recovery seed when a user imports a wallet using SLIP39 shares (a type of multi-share mnemonic backup). Previously, the wallet decrypted the shares with the passphrase entered at import time and stored the resulting master secret. That meant if the user later opened the wallet with a different passphrase, the wallet would derive the wrong keys. The change keeps the master secret in its encrypted form, so any passphrase works the same way the original SLIP39 shares do. This is a correctness fix for passphrase handling in SLIP39 wallets.

Recommended action

Treat this as a bug-fix patch that corrects key derivation for SLIP39 wallets imported with a passphrase. Users who imported SLIP39 shares with a non-empty passphrase before this fix should verify that their wallet derives the expected addresses; if not, they may need to re-import. No immediate exploit path is evident from the diff alone, but incorrect key derivation can lead to funds appearing inaccessible or backups not matching wallet state.

Security signals we found

01

SLIP39 passphrase handling changed from one-time decryption to persistent encrypted master secret

02

Stored seed now derives correct keys regardless of which passphrase is later used

03

New unit test explicitly checks passphrase-variant key derivation parity

04

Submodule bump suggests related crypto library changes

Risk score

Why this scored 58/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 18/30
Exploitability 12/25
Stealth signal 8/15
Affected reach 10/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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