AI-generated analysisPublished automatically and not human-verified. Validated context appears in community notes below.
← Watch feed
Low 44 Bitcoin

disable transaction version and locktime editing once signed

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Craig Raw

50/100 · Thin
disable transaction version and locktime editing once signed
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit tightens Sparrow Wallet's user interface so that once a Bitcoin transaction has been signed, the user can no longer edit its version number or locktime fields. Before the change, the form relied on a simpler 'isEditable' check that could leave these fields enabled after signatures were added. Editing those fields after signing would change the transaction's hash (TXID), making the existing signatures invalid and potentially confusing the user into broadcasting a transaction that wallets or the network will reject. The fix centralizes the disable logic and makes editability explicitly depend on whether the transaction already contains script signatures or witness data.

Recommended action

Treat as a low-severity defensive hardening fix. Verify that all other post-signing editable fields (inputs, outputs, fee fields, etc.) are similarly guarded by the updated isEditable() logic, and that no alternate code path can bypass the UI disable state. Consider adding an automated UI test that asserts version and locktime controls are disabled once a transaction has scriptSigs or witnesses.

Security signals we found

01

UI field left editable after cryptographic signing could allow user to invalidate signatures

02

Transaction malleability / signature invalidation via post-sign field edits

03

Centralization of editability logic reduces chance of inconsistent disable states

04

No cryptographic or serialization hardening; purely defensive UX control

Risk score

Why this scored 44/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 12/30
Exploitability 8/25
Stealth signal 6/15
Affected reach 7/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

Community notes

Notes can correct, qualify, or add evidence to the AI analysis. Every note shown here has been validated by a human moderator.

No validated notes yet.

The AI analysis stands alone for now. Submit a note if you can add evidence or important context.