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Low 46 Bitcoin

refuse descriptors that do not derive on the standard receive and change chains when importing a wallet or keystore, and warn of them in the descriptor editor

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Craig Raw

50/100 · Thin
refuse descriptors that do not derive on the standard receive and change chains when importing a wallet or keystore, and warn of them in the descriptor editor
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit tightens how Sparrow Wallet handles Bitcoin output descriptors imported from files, hardware wallets, QR codes, and the descriptor editor. It now rejects (or warns about) descriptors whose key paths don't follow the standard 'receive' and 'change' chains used by most wallets. This is a defensive change: non-standard derivation paths could previously be accepted silently, which might let a malicious or malformed descriptor make Sparrow derive addresses the user didn't expect, potentially hiding funds or tricking the user into sending to attacker-controlled addresses.

Recommended action

Users and integrators should upgrade to the release containing this commit. When importing wallets or keystores from external descriptors, verify that the descriptor uses standard receive/change derivation paths; if not, Sparrow will now refuse the import. Review the drongo submodule diff for the exact path-validation logic and ensure no import path bypasses verifyStandardChildDerivations().

Security signals we found

01

New validation of BIP32 derivation paths on all descriptor import paths

02

Rejection of descriptors with non-standard receive/change chains during wallet/keystore import

03

Warning (but not rejection) retained for descriptor editor where user can amend the descriptor

04

Potential address-derivation mismatch risk mitigated by enforcing standard /0/* and /1/* or /<0;1>/* patterns

05

Submodule update suggests underlying descriptor-parsing library changes implement the new checks

Risk score

Why this scored 46/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 12/30
Exploitability 8/25
Stealth signal 6/15
Affected reach 10/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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