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Low 28 Bitcoin

remove ineffective eckey clear

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Craig Raw

35/100 · Opaque
remove ineffective eckey clear
✓ Descriptive subject! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit removes several calls that tried to wipe private-key material from memory. The developer says these wipes were 'ineffective' because the underlying ECKey object still held the secret bytes. The change is a cleanup, but it slightly increases the window during which private key bytes may sit in memory. It does not introduce a remotely exploitable bug; the main risk is a small worsening of local memory-exposure hygiene.

Recommended action

Treat as a minor defensive cleanup rather than a critical vulnerability. Review whether ECKey or its subclass should implement effective secure clearing, and ensure that derived Key objects and SecureString passwords are still being cleared promptly. No urgent patch or advisory is warranted from this commit alone.

Security signals we found

01

Removal of explicit private-key zeroization calls

02

Commit message labels prior zeroization as ineffective

03

Private key material remains referenced longer after use

04

One location changes clear target from masterPrivateKey to masterPrivateExtendedKey

Risk score

Why this scored 28/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 5/30
Exploitability 2/25
Stealth signal 8/15
Affected reach 4/15
Confidence 6/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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