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Low 35 Monero

Add FHSE and other wallet-core improvements

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Justin Ehrenhofer

45/100 · Thin
Add FHSE and other wallet-core improvements
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This is a large feature and hardening update for a Monero wallet app. It adds FIDO2 security-key support (called FHSE), encrypted metadata backup, memory-hardening flags for Android and iOS, a new transaction-history screen, seed-phrase verification, and changes how 'monero:' payment links are handled so they cannot bypass the app's lock screen. Most of the changes are defensive, but the size of the patch and the new deep-link handling deserve careful review because any mistake there could let a malicious link open the send screen while the wallet is still locked.

Recommended action

Treat this as a significant security-relevant release, not a routine update. Reviewers should: (1) audit the full route_policy.dart and PaymentLinkGate logic in the Dart layer to confirm no route can be reached while AppSession.isUnlocked is false; (2) verify that Android's getInitialRoute/shouldHandleDeeplinking overrides and iOS FlutterDeepLinkingEnabled=false cannot be circumvented by intent flags or scene restoration; (3) inspect the wallet_fhse and wallet_backup_platform plugin implementations (not shown in this diff) for key handling and backup encryption; (4) validate that the new backup_rules.xml and iCloud container only expose the intended metadata_backup directory; (5) run static/dynamic analysis on the updated native dependencies (YubiKit, BoringSSL, libsodium, libcbor) and confirm reproducible Swift package pins in CI.

Security signals we found

01

New FIDO2/Hardware security key integration (wallet_fhse, YubiKit Swift 1.4.0)

02

New encrypted metadata backup with iCloud/Android backup rules

03

Android native memory hardening: memtagMode sync, nativeHeapZeroInitialized, gwpAsanMode always

04

iOS hardened-process entitlements: hardened-heap, checked-allocations, dyld-ro, enhanced-security-version 2

05

Payment-link handling rewritten to prevent deep-link bypass of app lock

06

Flutter deep linking explicitly disabled on Android and iOS

07

Route policy added to deny unlisted/locked routes

08

Large dependency and build-tool version bumps

09

New history export and seed verification UI flows

Risk score

Why this scored 35/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 8/30
Exploitability 6/25
Stealth signal 5/15
Affected reach 7/15
Confidence 6/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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