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Low 26 Bitcoin

Avoid grind signatures in fuzz builds

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Joost Jager

90/100 · Strong
Avoid grind signatures in fuzz builds

Disable default lightning features in the fuzz crate and persister
so fuzz builds do not inherit grind_signatures.

Add a compile-time guard for fuzzing plus grind_signatures.
Refresh the splice fuzz seed because the no-low-R weight model
changes the signed funding transaction amount and fake-hash txid.
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit fixes a fuzz-testing configuration issue. The project has a feature called 'grind_signatures' that makes cryptographic signatures slightly smaller on average, but it is meant only for real network use because it changes transaction weights. The fuzz tests were accidentally inheriting this feature, which could make fuzzing miss bugs that appear with the normal signature size. The patch disables the feature in fuzz builds and adds a compile-time guard to prevent accidentally enabling it in fuzzing mode. It also updates a hard-coded test seed to match the new (slightly larger) transaction weight.

Recommended action

No immediate production action required. This is a fuzzing-harness hardening change. Reviewers should verify that fuzz builds no longer inherit grind_signatures and that the updated splice seed still exercises the intended code paths.

Security signals we found

01

Compile-time guard prevents dangerous feature combination

02

Feature misconfiguration in fuzz builds could mask real-world transaction-weight bugs

03

grind_signatures changes signature size/weight behavior

04

Fuzz seeds updated to reflect changed weight model

Risk score

Why this scored 26/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 5/30
Exploitability 3/25
Stealth signal 4/15
Affected reach 3/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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