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Informational 23 Bitcoin

Report LSPS5 fallback persistence

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Elias Rohrer

58/100 · Thin
Report LSPS5 fallback persistence

When a prunable client gains state before removal, persist() now reports
that the forced peer-state write reached the store.

Co-Authored-By: HAL 9000
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This is a tiny one-line fix in a Lightning Service Provider feature (LSPS5). Previously, when the code had to force-save peer state for a client that was about to be removed, it saved the data but forgot to report that it had done so. The fix makes the code correctly report 'yes, we persisted.' This is a bookkeeping/reporting bug, not a direct funds-loss vulnerability, but incorrect persistence reporting could mislead callers about whether state was saved.

Recommended action

Treat as a low-risk correctness fix. Review callers of the affected function to confirm they handle did_persist correctly and that no downstream logic relied on the previous false-negative reporting. No urgent security response is indicated by the diff alone.

Security signals we found

01

Incorrect boolean return value for persistence status

02

State-management bookkeeping fix in prunable client lifecycle

03

No cryptographic, signature, or channel-funding logic changed

Risk score

Why this scored 23/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 5/30
Exploitability 2/25
Stealth signal 3/15
Affected reach 4/15
Confidence 6/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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