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Informational 20 Bitcoin

Refactor `LSPS5ServiceHandler` to hold a `PeerState`

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Elias Rohrer

73/100 · Adequate
Refactor `LSPS5ServiceHandler` to hold a `PeerState`

Going forward, we'll add serialization logic for LSPS5 types. To contain
the persisted state a bit better (and to align the model with LSPS1/2),
we refactor the `LSPS5ServiceHandler` to hold a `PeerState` object.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit is a code cleanup in the LSPS5 (webhook) service module. It replaces a flat hash map of webhooks with a per-peer state object, moving webhook storage from a Mutex to an RwLock and adding helper methods. The stated goal is to prepare for future serialization/persistence work and to match the design used in LSPS1/LSPS2. There is no direct security fix here, but any refactor that changes locking and data structures can introduce subtle concurrency or correctness bugs.

Recommended action

Treat as a routine refactor. Reviewers should verify that the new RwLock write-lock scope does not overlap dangerously with other locks (e.g., `channel_manager`, `last_pruning` Mutex) and that the `PeerState` Vec-backed storage still enforces `max_webhooks_per_client` correctly. No immediate security patch is required based on this commit alone.

Security signals we found

01

Locking change: Mutex<HashMap> replaced with RwLock<HashMap> plus inner Vec. Write locks are now held across longer critical sections (prune + operation).

02

Potential for lock-ordering or deadlock regressions if future code acquires other locks while holding the outer RwLock write guard.

03

PeerState uses a Vec instead of a HashMap for app-name lookups, changing lookup/insertion from O(1) average to O(n). This is unlikely to be exploitable given small `max_webhooks_per_client`, but is a performance/DoS-relevant design change.

04

No new input validation, authorization, or serialization logic is added in this commit.

05

The new test only covers functional correctness of URL updates, not security.

Risk score

Why this scored 20/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 2/30
Exploitability 3/25
Stealth signal 2/15
Affected reach 3/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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