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Low 44 Bitcoin

Add `prev_ouput` to `NegotiatedTxInput` for SIGHASH_ALL & key-spend checks

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Duncan Dean

85/100 · Strong
Add `prev_ouput` to `NegotiatedTxInput` for SIGHASH_ALL & key-spend checks

In a following commit, We'll use the contained scriptPubKeys to validate
P2WPKH and P2TR key path spends and to assist in checking that signatures
in provided holder witnesses use SIGHASH_ALL to prevent funds being frozen
or held ransom.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit adds the previous transaction output (the 'prev_output', which includes the scriptPubKey and amount) to an internal data structure called NegotiatedTxInput used during interactive transaction construction in Lightning. The commit message says a future change will use this extra data to verify that certain Bitcoin spends are valid and that signatures use the SIGHASH_ALL mode, which helps prevent funds from being frozen or held hostage by a malicious peer. By itself, this patch only stores more data; it does not yet implement the actual security checks.

Recommended action

Review the follow-up commit that implements the actual P2WPKH/P2TR key-spend and SIGHASH_ALL checks to confirm the new prev_output field is used correctly and that the security goal is achieved. Treat this commit as groundwork, not as a complete fix.

Security signals we found

01

Commit message describes preventing funds from being frozen or held ransom via SIGHASH_ALL enforcement

02

Commit message describes validating P2WPKH and P2TR key-path spends using scriptPubKey data

03

Adds prev_output (scriptPubKey + value) to an interactive-tx input structure

04

No actual validation logic is present in this commit; it is preparatory

Risk score

Why this scored 44/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 12/30
Exploitability 8/25
Stealth signal 7/15
Affected reach 8/15
Confidence 6/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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