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Informational 21 Bitcoin

Avoid returning user error when stfu is not ready to be sent yet

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Wilmer Paulino

85/100 · Strong
Avoid returning user error when stfu is not ready to be sent yet

When we propose quiescence due to a user initiated action, such as a
splice, it's possible that the `stfu` message is not ready to be sent
out yet due to the state machine pending a change. This would result in
an error communicated back to the caller of
`ChannelManager::splice_channel`, but this is unnecessary and confusing,
the splice is still pending and will be carried out once quiescence is
eventually negotiated.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This change fixes a minor user-experience issue in the Lightning Dev Kit's channel splicing flow. Previously, if a user requested a splice but the internal state machine wasn't ready to send the required 'stfu' (stop, wait for update) message immediately, the code would return an error to the caller even though the splice was still pending and would proceed later. Now it logs the condition and returns success with no message, avoiding an unnecessary and confusing error.

Recommended action

Review as a normal bugfix. Verify that suppressing the error does not mask any state where the splice should legitimately be aborted, and that the pending splice will reliably resume when quiescence becomes ready. No immediate security response is indicated.

Security signals we found

01

Change converts an error return into a silent success with debug logging

02

Affects state-machine handling of the BOLT quiescence `stfu` message

03

Potential for user-initiated operation to proceed despite an internal condition that previously failed

04

No input validation, bounds checking, or cryptographic changes present

Risk score

Why this scored 21/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 4/30
Exploitability 0/25
Stealth signal 2/15
Affected reach 3/15
Confidence 8/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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