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Informational 20 Bitcoin

Prefactor: Simplify `last_notification_sent` tracking

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Elias Rohrer

63/100 · Adequate
Prefactor: Simplify `last_notification_sent` tracking

While bLIP-55 describes that the service should wait at least some
cooldown between sending notifications per individual `method`, there is
nothing that keeps us from simplifying our approach to apply the
cooldown to *any* notifications sent, especially since we just reduced
the cooldown period to 1 minute elsewhere. Here, we therefore simplify
the `last_notification_sent` field to just be a `Option<LSPSDateTime>`.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit is a code cleanup (prefactor) that changes how a webhook notification cooldown is tracked. Previously, the system remembered the last time each type of notification was sent separately. Now it only remembers the last time any notification was sent. This means a user could hit the cooldown for one kind of alert and then not receive a different kind of alert for up to a minute, even though the old behavior would have allowed it. The change is intentional and documented in the commit message, and the tests were updated to match. It is not a hidden vulnerability, but it does slightly broaden when notifications can be suppressed.

Recommended action

Treat as a behavior-affecting refactor rather than a security patch. Review whether a global one-minute cooldown for all LSPS5 webhook notifications is acceptable for downstream users, and ensure documentation or release notes mention the changed semantics. No urgent security action is required.

Security signals we found

01

Rate-limiting logic changed from per-method to global cooldown

02

Behavioral test expectations changed to match new cooldown semantics

03

Commit explicitly describes the change as intentional simplification, not a fix

04

No input validation, memory safety, or cryptographic changes present

Risk score

Why this scored 20/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 2/30
Exploitability 3/25
Stealth signal 2/15
Affected reach 3/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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