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Informational 24 Bitcoin

Add `LSPS2ServiceHandler` persistence

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Elias Rohrer

58/100 · Thin
Add `LSPS2ServiceHandler` persistence

We add simple `persist` call to `LSPS2ServiceHandler` that sequentially
persist all the peer states under a key that encodes their node id.
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit adds a new save-to-disk feature for the LSPS2 service handler in the Lightning Dev Kit's liquidity module. It makes the handler remember peer state across restarts by writing it to a key-value store. There is no direct security bug visible in the diff, but the change introduces new code paths that handle locks, serialization, and storage, and it removes the kv_store field from the top-level LiquidityManager in favor of embedding it inside the handler. A small typo in a doc comment was also introduced.

Recommended action

Review the lock scope around persist_peer_state to ensure the KVStore future is not capturing the RwLock read guard or inner Mutex guard across await points. Verify that PeerState::encode() cannot panic while the Mutex is held, which could poison the lock. Add tests for persistence correctness, crash recovery, and concurrent peer mutations during persist(). Consider documenting the key format and namespace collision policy. The typo 'hendler' in manager.rs should be fixed.

Security signals we found

01

New persistence surface: serialization and KVStore write path added for peer state

02

Concurrency pattern: read-lock of per_peer_state while holding inner Mutex<PeerState> during encode()

03

Async storage call inside lock scope: future created while outer_state_lock is held, then awaited outside the lock

04

Generic KVStore now embedded in LSPS2ServiceHandler, changing object ownership and clone requirements

05

Sync wrapper polls async persist() with a dummy waker and treats Pending as unreachable

06

No input validation or access control added around persistence keys

Risk score

Why this scored 24/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 5/30
Exploitability 3/25
Stealth signal 2/15
Affected reach 4/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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