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Moderate 55 Bitcoin

Limit pending requests and peers in LSPS1 service

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Elias Rohrer

68/100 · Adequate
Limit pending requests and peers in LSPS1 service

Add per-peer and global rate limiting to `LSPS1ServiceHandler` to
prevent resource exhaustion, mirroring the existing LSPS2 pattern.

Introduce `MAX_PENDING_REQUESTS_PER_PEER` (10),
`MAX_TOTAL_PENDING_REQUESTS` (1000), and `MAX_TOTAL_PEERS` (100000)
constants and enforce them in `handle_create_order_request`. Rejected
requests receive a `CreateOrderError` with
`LSPS0_CLIENT_REJECTED_ERROR_CODE`. A `total_pending_requests` atomic
counter tracks the global count, and a `verify_pending_request_counter`
debug assertion ensures it stays in sync.

Co-Authored-By: HAL 9000
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit adds rate limits to the LSPS1 (a Lightning liquidity service protocol) server code. It caps how many unfinished order requests a single peer can have open, how many total unfinished requests can exist across all peers, and how many distinct peers can be tracked. Requests that exceed these limits are rejected with a standard error. This is a defensive hardening change to prevent a malicious or buggy peer from consuming excessive server memory or processing time.

Recommended action

Review the chosen limits (10/1000/100000) against expected production load and ensure the global total_pending_requests counter is correctly decremented on all prune/error paths, as the debug assertion suggests this is a new invariant. Consider whether the 100,000 peer cap is appropriate for public services.

Security signals we found

01

Adds rate limiting to prevent resource exhaustion / DoS

02

Mirrors existing LSPS2 defensive pattern

03

Rejects over-limit requests with standard LSPS0 client-rejected error code

04

Adds integration test for per-peer request limit enforcement

Risk score

Why this scored 55/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 12/30
Exploitability 14/25
Stealth signal 8/15
Affected reach 10/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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