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Low 44 Bitcoin

Don't broadcast manual-funded chan closing txn on HTLC timeouts

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Matt Corallo

85/100 · Strong
Don't broadcast manual-funded chan closing txn on HTLC timeouts

In 6c5ef049b8d0ec174d7368d48b7b429efffb4a61 we prevented broadcast
of the commitment transactions if the funding transaction has not
yet appeared on-chain for manual-broadcast channels to avoid
spurious bumps or unbroadcastable transactions. However, we missed
the case where a channel is closed due to HTLCs timing out.

Here we fix that by doing the same broadcast-gating when
automatically force-closing a channel due to HTLC timeouts.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This patch fixes a follow-up bug in the Lightning Dev Kit's channel monitor. For channels where the user manually broadcasts the funding transaction, the software could incorrectly try to broadcast a force-closing transaction before the funding transaction had actually appeared on-chain—specifically when HTLC payments timed out. This could lead to wasted transaction fees, failed broadcasts, or unnecessary on-chain activity. The fix applies the same safety gate already used for normal commitment broadcasts to the HTLC-timeout force-close path.

Recommended action

Review related force-close and timeout paths for similar missing gating. Add regression tests covering manual-broadcast channels with HTLC timeouts before funding is seen on-chain. Consider centralizing the broadcast-gating check to reduce future inconsistency.

Security signals we found

01

Denial-of-service-like resource waste via spurious transaction broadcast attempts

02

Potential fee loss from premature or invalid transaction submission

03

Inconsistent safety gating across force-close code paths

04

Follow-up fix to a prior broadcast-gating commit

Risk score

Why this scored 44/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 12/30
Exploitability 5/25
Stealth signal 8/15
Affected reach 7/15
Confidence 8/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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