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Moderate 57 Bitcoin

Only sign funding transaction on monitor update resumption

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Wilmer Paulino

73/100 · Adequate
Only sign funding transaction on monitor update resumption

The `handle_channel_resumption` path is reachable from both channel
reestablish and monitor update completion. Since we only want to sign
once we know the monitor update has completed, it's possible we could
have unintentionally attempted to sign if we were still pending the
monitor update but had a channel reestablish occur.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This change fixes a timing issue in the Lightning Dev Kit where a funding transaction could be signed too early. Previously, the code that decides whether to sign a funding transaction could run both when a channel reconnects and when a pending monitor update finishes. The fix ensures signing only happens after the monitor update has actually completed, preventing a possible invalid or premature signature attempt if a channel reestablish happened while a monitor update was still pending.

Recommended action

Apply the patch. Review related resumption paths to ensure no other operations assume monitor-update completion without explicitly checking `is_awaiting_monitor_update()`. Consider adding regression tests that interleave channel reestablish with a pending monitor update during interactive funding.

Security signals we found

01

Premature cryptographic signature of funding transaction

02

Race between channel reestablish and monitor update completion

03

State-machine timing bug in dual-trigger resumption path

04

Potential invalid signature or inconsistent channel state

Risk score

Why this scored 57/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 18/30
Exploitability 10/25
Stealth signal 8/15
Affected reach 10/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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