Revert fuzz changes in 61bc1e06e75113238501e7ce29e793aa3ba43778
What the developer wrote
Authored by Matt Corallo
Revert fuzz changes in 61bc1e06e75113238501e7ce29e793aa3ba43778
This reverts the changes to `fuzz/src/full_stack.rs` in commit
61bc1e06e75113238501e7ce29e793aa3ba43778 which were spuriously
included after a rebase and ultimately broke the fuzzing test.
What changed, and why it matters
This commit reverts two accidental changes in a fuzzing test file. The changes were mistakenly included during a previous rebase and caused the fuzzing test to break. The fix restores the original expected test values so the fuzz test passes again. There is no indication this affects real Lightning node behavior or introduces a security vulnerability.
No security action required. This is a test-only revert fixing a broken fuzz corpus. Routine review/merge is sufficient.
Security signals we found
No strong security signals were identified.
Evidence from the diff
The commit reverts changes to fuzz/src/full_stack.rs introduced in commit 61bc1e06e75113238501e7ce29e793aa3ba43778. The reverted lines only modified hardcoded expected values in a fuzzing seed corpus: a channel ID comment (3f000000 back to 2f000000) and a serialized test input byte (0x53 back to 0x52). These are test fixture values, not production code. The commit message explicitly states the prior changes were spuriously included after a rebase and broke the fuzzing test.
Changed components
fuzz/src/full_stack.rsInspect captured patch +2 / −2
diff --git a/fuzz/src/full_stack.rs b/fuzz/src/full_stack.rs
index ee7f01a..3a5a549 100644
--- a/fuzz/src/full_stack.rs
+++ b/fuzz/src/full_stack.rs
@@ -1182,7 +1182,7 @@ fn two_peer_forwarding_seed() -> Vec<u8> {
// broadcast funding transaction
ext_from_hex("0b", &mut test);
- // by now client should have sent a channel_ready (CHECK 4: SendChannelReady to 03020000 for chan 3f000000)
+ // by now client should have sent a channel_ready (CHECK 4: SendChannelReady to 03020000 for chan 2f000000)
// inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
ext_from_hex("030112", &mut test);
@@ -1441,7 +1441,7 @@ fn two_peer_forwarding_seed() -> Vec<u8> {
// inbound read from peer id 0 of len 193
ext_from_hex("0300c1", &mut test);
// end of update_add_htlc from 0 to 1 via client and mac
- ext_from_hex("ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff 5300000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000", &mut test);
+ ext_from_hex("ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff 5200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000", &mut test);
// inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
ext_from_hex("030012", &mut test);
Why this scored 15/100
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