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Low 32 Bitcoin

Return early on duplicate calls to `funding_transaction_signed`

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Wilmer Paulino

73/100 · Adequate
Return early on duplicate calls to `funding_transaction_signed`

We may produce duplicate `FundingTransactionReadyForSigning` events if
the user has processed an initial event but has not yet called back with
`funding_transaction_signed` and a peer reconnection occurs. If the user
also handles the duplicate events, any duplicate calls to
`funding_transaction_signed` after an initial successful one would
return an error. This doesn't make sense, as the API should remain
idempotent, so we return early on any duplicate calls.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This change makes a Lightning channel funding API more forgiving. Previously, if a user already signed a funding transaction and then accidentally called the signing function again—perhaps because the app showed the same request twice after a peer reconnection—the library would return an error. Now it silently returns early instead. This is a robustness fix that prevents harmless duplicate calls from being treated as failures, which could confuse or break wallet software.

Recommended action

Treat as a low-risk robustness improvement. Reviewers should confirm that returning early in both branches does not skip any required post-processing (e.g., broadcasting or persisting state) and that the duplicate detection conditions are precise enough to avoid masking unrelated errors. No urgent security response is indicated.

Security signals we found

01

API misuse error downgraded to silent success on duplicate input

02

Duplicate event handling path made idempotent

03

No cryptographic or state-machine weakening evident in diff

Risk score

Why this scored 32/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 8/30
Exploitability 3/25
Stealth signal 4/15
Affected reach 6/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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