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Low 27 Bitcoin

Remove awaiting quiescence channel state flag

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Wilmer Paulino

68/100 · Adequate
Remove awaiting quiescence channel state flag

With the introduction of `QuiescentAction`, the flag has essentially
become duplicate state, so we opt to remove it in favor of just checking
whether we have a pending `FundedChannel::quiescent_action`. Since the
quiescent flags are never persisted, we can simply remove it and update
the other flags, freeing up a bit for future use.
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit is a code cleanup in a Lightning network implementation. It removes a duplicate internal flag used to track whether a channel is trying to become quiet (quiescent) for operations like splicing. The same information is now tracked by checking whether a pending 'QuiescentAction' exists. The change frees up a bit in the channel state flags for future use and simplifies state management. It does not appear to fix a known security vulnerability, but any change to state-machine logic in payment channel code carries some risk of introducing subtle bugs.

Recommended action

Treat as a normal code review item. Verify that the new try_send_stfu early-return conditions exactly preserve prior behavior, especially around reconnection, shutdown races, and splice reattempts. Run the updated quiescence tests and consider additional edge-case tests for shutdown-during-quiescence and reconnection-during-quiescence.

Security signals we found

01

State-machine refactor in channel quiescence/splicing logic

02

Removal of duplicate state flag with behavior-preserving intent

03

Logic change in stfu initiation conditions

04

No vendor security disclosure or CVE referenced in commit

05

No external incident or vulnerability disclosure supplied

Risk score

Why this scored 27/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 5/30
Exploitability 5/25
Stealth signal 5/15
Affected reach 5/15
Confidence 4/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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