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Low 32 Bitcoin

Assume splicing input value from channel parameters

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Wilmer Paulino

50/100 · Thin
Assume splicing input value from channel parameters
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit changes how a Bitcoin Lightning channel signer calculates the value of the old funding output when signing a splice transaction. Instead of accepting the value as a caller-provided argument, it now derives the value from the channel's own stored parameters and adds a check that the transaction input actually matches the expected funding outpoint. This removes an opportunity for a caller to pass a wrong or manipulated input value, which could otherwise cause the signer to produce an invalid or subtly harmful signature.

Recommended action

Treat as a defensive hardening patch. Review any custom implementations of `EcdsaChannelSigner` outside the repository to ensure they adopt the new signature and derive the splice input value from channel parameters rather than caller input. Consider whether the new assertion could introduce a denial-of-service risk if channel parameters and the splice input become temporarily inconsistent, and add tests for mismatched outpoint/value cases.

Security signals we found

01

API hardening: removes externally supplied `input_value` in favor of internally derived channel value

02

New assertion ties the splice input to the channel's recorded funding outpoint

03

Prevents potential mismatch between claimed input value and actual channel funding amount during splicing signature hash computation

04

Splicing is a newer, complex Lightning protocol feature with historically higher bug density

Risk score

Why this scored 32/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 8/30
Exploitability 5/25
Stealth signal 4/15
Affected reach 6/15
Confidence 6/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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