AI-generated analysisPublished automatically and not human-verified. Validated context appears in community notes below.
← Watch feed
Low 28 Bitcoin

Include release_held_htlc blinded paths in RAA

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Valentine Wallace

80/100 · Strong
Include release_held_htlc blinded paths in RAA

As part of supporting sending payments as an often-offline sender, the sender
needs to send held_htlc_available onion messages such that the reply path to
the message terminates at their always-online channel counterparty that is
holding the HTLC. That way when the recipient responds with release_held_htlc,
the sender's counterparty will receive that message.

Here the counterparty starts including said reply paths in the revoke_and_ack
message destined for the sender, so the sender can use these paths in
subsequent held_htlc_available messages.

We put the paths in the RAA to ensure the sender receives the blinded paths,
because failure to deliver the paths means the HTLC will timeout/fail.
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit adds support for a new Lightning protocol feature for 'often-offline' senders. It makes a channel counterparty include special reply paths inside revoke_and_ack (RAA) messages so the sender can later ask for held payments to be released. The change itself is a feature addition, not a direct security fix, but it touches sensitive message handling and could affect payment reliability or privacy if the blinded paths are misused or leaked.

Recommended action

Treat as a normal feature commit. Review the new path_for_release_held_htlc callback for correct binding to HTLC IDs and channel/counterparty context, ensure blinded paths are generated with appropriate expiry and privacy constraints, and verify that including paths in RAA does not leak sender identity or enable path-replay attacks. No immediate security patch action is indicated by the supplied materials.

Security signals we found

01

Adds blinded onion-message paths to a channel control message (RevokeAndACK)

02

Touches HTLC state machine and pending inbound HTLC handling

03

Introduces callback-based path generation inside sensitive channel operations

04

No explicit security bug fix or vulnerability disclosure in commit message or diff

Risk score

Why this scored 28/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 5/30
Exploitability 3/25
Stealth signal 4/15
Affected reach 6/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

Community notes

Notes can correct, qualify, or add evidence to the AI analysis. Every note shown here has been validated by a human moderator.

No validated notes yet.

The AI analysis stands alone for now. Submit a note if you can add evidence or important context.