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Low 42 Bitcoin

Drop `OutputSweeper` non-`BestBlock` `Readable` implementation

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Matt Corallo

85/100 · Strong
Drop `OutputSweeper` non-`BestBlock` `Readable` implementation

`OutputSweeper`, like any `Confirm`/`Listen` client, needs to have
the chain synced back up on startup. Thus, like `ChannelMonitor`
and `ChannelManager`, we force users to `read` it via a method that
gives them the latest chain tip so that they can sync.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit removes an older, less-safe way to restore the OutputSweeper object from disk. The old method let users load it without providing the current blockchain tip, which could leave the sweeper unaware of recent blocks and potentially miss on-chain events it needs to react to. The remaining method forces callers to supply the latest 'best block' so the sweeper can resync on startup, matching how other critical components already work. It is a hardening/correctness change rather than a clear-cut remote exploit fix.

Recommended action

Treat as a defensive hardening patch. Users and downstream maintainers should migrate any code that called the old OutputSweeper::read path to the (BestBlock, OutputSweeper) return path and ensure the sweeper is registered and synced against the current chain tip on startup. No emergency response is indicated by the diff alone.

Security signals we found

01

Removed deserialization path that relied on persisted best_block without external chain-tip verification

02

Forces resync of a Confirm/Listen client on startup by requiring BestBlock argument

03

Prevents potential missed on-chain events due to stale chain tip after restore

04

Consistency hardening with ChannelMonitor/ChannelManager deserialization patterns

Risk score

Why this scored 42/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 12/30
Exploitability 8/25
Stealth signal 6/15
Affected reach 7/15
Confidence 6/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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