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Informational 22 Bitcoin

Support creating reply_path for HeldHtlcAvailable

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Valentine Wallace

68/100 · Adequate
Support creating reply_path for HeldHtlcAvailable

As part of supporting sending payments as an often-offline sender, the sender
needs to send held_htlc_available onion messages such that the reply path to
the message terminates at their always-online channel counterparty that is
holding the HTLC. That way when the recipient responds with release_held_htlc,
the sender's counterparty will receive that message.

Here we add a method for creating said reply path, which will be used in the
next commit.
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit adds a helper to build a private return-address (a 'reply path') for a new type of Lightning message used when an often-offline sender asks a recipient to release a held payment. The change itself is plumbing for an upcoming feature; it does not appear to fix a known vulnerability or introduce an obvious one, but it touches sensitive payment-handling code and is part of a larger async-payments design whose security depends on details not shown here.

Recommended action

Review the subsequent commit that consumes this helper to ensure the reply path is only used for held HTLCs the local node legitimately controls, that InterceptId collisions cannot be exploited, and that the blinded path padding and context authentication prevent reply-path hijacking or release-message replay.

Security signals we found

01

Adds new blinded reply-path context for async payment release messages

02

Derives InterceptId from HTLC and channel identifiers for release authorization

03

Uses PADDED_PATH_LENGTH dummy hops to pad the blinded path

04

Part of a multi-commit async-payments feature; security relevance depends on follow-up usage

05

No explicit security claim, CVE, or bug fix language in commit message

Risk score

Why this scored 22/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 3/30
Exploitability 2/25
Stealth signal 4/15
Affected reach 3/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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