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Low 46 Bitcoin

Prefer outbound_scid_alias over short_channel_id in get_outbound_payment_scid

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Alkamal01

73/100 · Adequate
Prefer outbound_scid_alias over short_channel_id in get_outbound_payment_scid

With splicing, the real SCID changes when a splice confirms while the
outbound_scid_alias remains stable. Prefer alias-first in
get_outbound_payment_scid so routes built before a splice confirmation
stay valid after.

Also fix route direction in fail_splice_on_tx_complete_error and update
onion_route_tests comment to state intent rather than describe change.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit changes how Lightning payment routes pick the identifier used for the first hop of an outbound payment. Previously the real channel ID was preferred; now a stable alias is preferred. The goal is to keep routes valid when a channel is 'spliced' (its on-chain funding transaction changes), because the real ID changes after a splice while the alias stays the same. The change is framed as a robustness improvement, not a security fix, though it can prevent payment failures and related error-handling edge cases.

Recommended action

Treat as a normal code review item. Verify that all callers of get_outbound_payment_scid handle the alias-first semantics correctly, especially any code that maps route hops back to channel objects by SCID. Confirm that counterparty behavior and gossip-based routing still work when the alias is used for the first hop. No urgent security action is indicated by the commit itself.

Security signals we found

01

Behavior change in payment routing identifier selection

02

Alias preferred over mutable real SCID to avoid route invalidation after splice confirmation

03

Test updates show previous assumptions about first-hop SCID were real-SCID-centric

04

No explicit security advisory, CVE, or vulnerability language in commit message or diff

Risk score

Why this scored 46/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 12/30
Exploitability 5/25
Stealth signal 8/15
Affected reach 10/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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