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Moderate 59 Bitcoin

Disallow net-negative contributions when adding value

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Wilmer Paulino

73/100 · Adequate
Disallow net-negative contributions when adding value

When a user requests to add value via coin-selected inputs, we should
strive to fulfill their request. Allowing them to remove value from the
channel is undesired as it goes against their request. While we still
allow adding outputs to enabled mixed contributions, their funds must
now always come from the set of coin-selected inputs, and must never
draw from the channel balance resulting in a smaller added value.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit fixes a logic bug in Lightning channel 'splicing'—a way to add or remove funds from an existing channel. Previously, when a user tried to add funds to a channel while also requesting some money be sent elsewhere, the software could silently reduce the channel balance instead of increasing it. The change now ensures that when wallet inputs are provided to add value, the added value truly goes into the channel and any side payments come only from those wallet inputs, not from the existing channel funds.

Recommended action

Treat as a correctness/security fix and include in the next maintenance release. Review related splicing/RBF paths to ensure no other sites still allow channel balance to be drawn down when the user requested a net add. No immediate emergency response is indicated absent a public exploit.

Security signals we found

01

Behavioral change prevents net-negative splice contributions when adding value

02

Removed subtraction of value_removed from shared input value in build_funding_contribution macro

03

Changed fee-buffer definition for input-backed contributions from inputs-minus-contribution to fee-plus-change

04

Rewrote splicing test to assert channel value increases and outputs are funded from inputs

05

No explicit CVE, advisory, or security disclosure referenced in commit or supplied materials

Risk score

Why this scored 59/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 18/30
Exploitability 12/25
Stealth signal 8/15
Affected reach 10/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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