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Low 29 Bitcoin

Allow cancellation of pending splice funding negotiations

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Wilmer Paulino

73/100 · Adequate
Allow cancellation of pending splice funding negotiations

A user may wish to cancel an in-flight funding negotiation for whatever
reason (e.g., mempool feerates have gone down, inability to sign, etc.),
so we should make it possible for them to do so. Note that this can only
be done for splice funding negotiations for which the user has made a
contribution to.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit adds a new public API that lets a Lightning node operator cancel a splice funding negotiation they started, as long as they have not yet signed the funding transaction. It replaces an older test-only cancellation path with a safer, more complete implementation that checks the user actually contributed inputs or outputs and refuses cancellation once signatures have been sent. The change is a defensive feature improvement rather than a fix for an active vulnerability.

Recommended action

No immediate action required. This is a feature addition with defensive guards. Users and integrators should review the new cancel_funding_contributed API documentation and ensure their applications handle the DiscardFunding and SpliceNegotiationFailed events correctly when a user cancels a splice.

Security signals we found

01

New public API added for canceling in-flight splice funding negotiations

02

Replaces test-only abandon_splice with guarded production method

03

Prevents cancellation after local signatures have been sent, reducing risk of inconsistent protocol state

04

Requires local contribution to funding inputs or outputs before allowing cancellation

05

Resets pending splice state and emits failure/discarding events

06

Sends TxAbort to counterparty and handles quiescence exit

07

Adds tests covering cancellation at multiple negotiation stages and refusal after signing

Risk score

Why this scored 29/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 5/30
Exploitability 3/25
Stealth signal 4/15
Affected reach 6/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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