AI-generated analysisPublished automatically and not human-verified. Validated context appears in community notes below.
← Watch feed
Low 47 Bitcoin

Ensure minimum RBF feerate satisfies BIP125

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Jeffrey Czyz

68/100 · Adequate
Ensure minimum RBF feerate satisfies BIP125

The spec's 25/24 multiplier doesn't always satisfy BIP125's relay
requirement of an absolute fee increase at low feerates, while a flat
+25 sat/kwu increment falls below the spec's 25/24 rule above 600
sat/kwu. Use max(prev + 25, ceil(prev * 25/24)) for our own RBFs to
satisfy both constraints, while still accepting the bare 25/24 rule
from counterparties.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit fixes how Lightning Dev Kit calculates the minimum fee rate when a user tries to speed up (RBF) a channel funding or splicing transaction. Previously, the code only required the new fee to be 25/24 of the old fee. At very low fee rates that percentage bump is too small to meet Bitcoin's BIP125 network-relay rule, so the replacement transaction could be rejected by the network and never confirm. The fix now uses the larger of (old fee + 25 sat/kwu) and (25/24 of old fee) for transactions this node creates, while still accepting the bare 25/24 rule from peers. This is a protocol-compliance/robustness fix, not a direct theft or remote-exploitation vulnerability.

Recommended action

Review and merge. The change is a targeted protocol-compliance fix. Downstream users running nodes that initiate splicing/RBF should update to avoid stuck replacement transactions at low feerates. No emergency mitigation is required.

Security signals we found

01

BIP125 relay-rule non-compliance for own RBF transactions at low feerates

02

Replacement transaction could be rejected by Bitcoin network mempools

03

Spec-compliant but insufficient absolute fee increment

04

RBF/splicing funding flow robustness improvement

05

No input validation bypass or memory-safety issue

Risk score

Why this scored 47/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 12/30
Exploitability 8/25
Stealth signal 6/15
Affected reach 9/15
Confidence 8/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

Community notes

Notes can correct, qualify, or add evidence to the AI analysis. Every note shown here has been validated by a human moderator.

No validated notes yet.

The AI analysis stands alone for now. Submit a note if you can add evidence or important context.