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Moderate 59 Bitcoin

Wait for inbound commitment_signed before producing tx_signatures

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Wilmer Paulino

73/100 · Adequate
Wait for inbound commitment_signed before producing tx_signatures

We only want to produce `tx_signatures` once we know that the monitor
update (either the initial one for a dual-funded channel, or a
`RenegotiatedFunding` one for a splice) has been persisted. If we
haven't received the counterparty's `commitment_signed` yet, then the
monitor update hasn't been created, leading us to pass the
`!awaiting_monitor_update` condition and produce a holder
`tx_signatures` message.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This patch fixes a timing issue in Lightning Dev Kit's channel manager. When opening or splicing a dual-funded Lightning channel, LDK could send its transaction signatures too early—before it had received the counterparty's commitment_signed message. Sending signatures prematurely could lead to signing a funding transaction before the necessary security state (the persisted monitor update) is in place, potentially creating a situation where funds are at risk if something goes wrong later. The fix adds a check to wait for the counterparty's commitment_signed before producing the holder's tx_signatures.

Recommended action

Treat this as a security-relevant correctness fix. Users running nodes that open dual-funded channels or perform splicing should upgrade to a release containing this commit. Review related interactive-tx and splice code paths for similar ordering assumptions. No immediate public incident response is indicated by the commit alone, but downstream maintainers should include this in release notes as a bugfix with security implications.

Security signals we found

01

Premature cryptographic signature generation in funding/splicing flow

02

Missing state synchronization before sensitive signing operation

03

Dual-funded channel and splice monitor-update timing dependency

04

Potential violation of safe signing precondition

Risk score

Why this scored 59/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 18/30
Exploitability 12/25
Stealth signal 10/15
Affected reach 8/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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