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Low 32 Bitcoin

Add enable_htlc_hold cfg flag + fail hold htlcs

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Valentine Wallace

76/100 · Adequate
Add enable_htlc_hold cfg flag + fail hold htlcs

As part of supporting sending payments as an often-offline sender, the
often-offline sender's channel counterparty needs to advertise a feature bit
indicating that they support holding onto the sender's HTLC until they receive
a release_held_htlc onion message from the recipient indicating that they are
online and ready to receive the payment.

Here we add a config flag to turn on advertising this feature, and fail back
hold_htlcs if this config flag is not set.

See-also <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/989>
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit adds an experimental, test-only configuration flag for a new Lightning protocol feature called 'HTLC hold.' When the flag is disabled (the default), the node rejects incoming HTLCs that ask it to hold payments. This is a defensive correctness change to make sure a node does not accidentally promise a service it has not advertised, rather than a fix for an active security bug.

Recommended action

No urgent action. Treat as normal feature work. If deploying HTLC hold in production later, ensure the feature is no longer test-only and that the backwards-compatibility note in the config documentation is observed.

Security signals we found

01

New feature flag gated by #[cfg(test)] indicates experimental/BOLTS-draft functionality

02

Defensive fail-back prevents a node from being asked to hold HTLCs it did not advertise

03

Commit message references BOLTS PR 989 (draft spec change)

04

No memory-safety issues, no panic/unwrap changes, no cryptographic changes

Risk score

Why this scored 32/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 5/30
Exploitability 5/25
Stealth signal 5/15
Affected reach 5/15
Confidence 8/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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