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Low 34 Bitcoin

Return an error when the intercept SCID is unknown to the LSPS2 service

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Willem Van Lint

73/100 · Adequate
Return an error when the intercept SCID is unknown to the LSPS2 service

HTLCs can be intercepted for multiple reasons unrelated to this handler:
- Other HTLC interceptors might have generated intercept SCIDs.
- The SCID of a closed channel might have fallen into the fake SCID
namespace.

The LSPS2 handler needs to indicate whether the specific SCID was known
to it, so other handlers can be called or the HTLC can be failed back.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This change fixes a logic bug in the LSPS2 liquidity service of rust-lightning. Previously, when an intercepted HTLC carried a short channel ID (SCID) that the LSPS2 service did not recognize, the handler silently did nothing. Now it returns a clear error so the caller can route the HTLC to another handler or fail it back. The fix prevents HTLCs from getting stuck or being silently dropped when multiple interceptors are active or when old SCIDs overlap with the fake SCID namespace.

Recommended action

Treat as a low-severity correctness fix. Review callers of the LSPS2 service handler to ensure they properly propagate or handle the returned APIError, especially when multiple HTLC interceptors are registered. No immediate emergency response is warranted, but the fix should be included in the next maintenance release.

Security signals we found

01

HTLC interception handler silently dropped unknown SCIDs before patch

02

Multiple interceptors or fake/closed-channel SCID collisions could cause HTLCs to stall

03

Patch adds explicit error return for unknown intercept SCID

04

No cryptographic or memory-safety issue; this is a protocol-handling correctness fix

Risk score

Why this scored 34/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 8/30
Exploitability 5/25
Stealth signal 4/15
Affected reach 6/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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