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Low 25 Bitcoin

Make `channel_parameters` explicit to `build_counterparty_commitment_tx`

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Wilmer Paulino

65/100 · Adequate
Make `channel_parameters` explicit to `build_counterparty_commitment_tx`

It's best to let the caller decide what the appropriate
`ChannelTransactionParameters` are as it has the most context.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit is a small internal refactoring in the Lightning Dev Kit's channel monitoring code. It changes a helper function so that the caller explicitly passes in the channel parameters, rather than the helper always grabbing them from a fixed internal field. The commit also adds safety comments and debug-only checks (debug_assert!) confirming this path is only used when there is a single active funding scope. There is no direct evidence in the commit or supplied references that this fixes an active security vulnerability; it appears to be a defensive code-quality change that makes future multi-funding-scope logic safer.

Recommended action

Treat as a normal code-quality / defensive refactoring patch. Reviewers should verify that all call sites of build_counterparty_commitment_tx now pass the correct channel parameters, especially in any follow-up work introducing multiple FundingScope support. No urgent security action is indicated by this commit alone.

Security signals we found

01

Refactoring to make channel parameter selection explicit rather than implicit

02

Added debug_assert! preconditions about single FundingScope

03

Added comments explaining invariants around initial monitor persistence and counterparty commitment updates

04

No direct security claim or CVE reference in commit message or diff

Risk score

Why this scored 25/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 5/30
Exploitability 3/25
Stealth signal 4/15
Affected reach 5/15
Confidence 5/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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