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Low 26 Bitcoin

Replace unused async offers based on creation time

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Valentine Wallace

73/100 · Adequate
Replace unused async offers based on creation time

Previously, we were refreshing unused async receive offers based on when the
corresponding invoice was confirmed as persisted. But the time when the invoice
is persisted doesn't really tell us when the offer became stale, since messages
may be delayed. Given we want to always have the freshest possible offer, we'd
like to replace an unused offer with a new one every few hours based on the
offer's age, regardless of when it was persisted by the server, which we now
do.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit changes how Lightning payment offers are refreshed in the cache. Previously, the software decided an unused offer was 'stale' based on when its invoice was confirmed saved by a server. Now it uses the offer's own creation time. The goal is to keep offers fresher and improve privacy by not reusing the same offer repeatedly. There is no obvious security vulnerability being fixed; it reads as a correctness and privacy improvement.

Recommended action

Treat as a routine correctness/privacy improvement. Review whether the new creation-time-based refresh interacts safely with clock skew or persisted state loaded from disk, since created_at is now a required serialized field. No urgent security action indicated from the diff alone.

Security signals we found

01

Change in staleness heuristic from server persistence time to local creation time

02

Privacy-related rationale: returning a new offer each time is better for privacy

03

No bounds checks, input validation, or memory-safety changes visible

04

No explicit vulnerability, CVE, or security bug described in commit message

Risk score

Why this scored 26/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 5/30
Exploitability 3/25
Stealth signal 4/15
Affected reach 5/15
Confidence 6/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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