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Low 37 Bitcoin

Merge rust-bitcoin/rust-bitcoin#7139: ops: harden ci workflows

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Andrew Poelstra

91/100 · Strong
Merge rust-bitcoin/rust-bitcoin#7139: ops: harden ci workflows

0c6f37729b8f003a3af10e9f8c0ed00a12876200 ops: harden ci workflows (Felipe Knorr Kuhn)

Pull request description:

Remove unnecessary write access, and tighten the actors and conditions for the labeler and ci failures workflows


ACKs for top commit:
satsfy:
tACK 0c6f377
apoelstra:
ACK 0c6f37729b8f003a3af10e9f8c0ed00a12876200; successfully ran local tests


Tree-SHA512: 3799e0045ca5b5f4a788bf372fc4cd6f9ab78f191b90fe85773064a2ad21974ca684baaba62a08b844e9f90d6c7887c2b03ba721274546587634c460cc12628e
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit tightens three GitHub Actions workflows to reduce the risk of supply-chain or repository-manipulation attacks. It removes an unused high-power permission (id-token: write), makes a CI-failure issue-matching script only trust issues created by the GitHub Actions bot, and validates data pulled from untrusted pull-request workflow artifacts before using it to label or comment on pull requests. These are defensive hardening changes rather than fixes for a known active exploit.

Recommended action

No immediate user action is required. Reviewers should verify the new validation logic covers all artifact-consuming steps and consider applying similar hardening to any other workflows that consume artifacts from pull_request runs.

Security signals we found

01

Removal of excessive workflow permission (id-token: write)

02

Validation of untrusted PR-produced artifact contents before use

03

Cross-check of PR head SHA against triggering workflow_run head_sha

04

Restriction of issue matching to github-actions[bot] author

05

Defensive hardening of CI labeler and failure-issue workflows

Risk score

Why this scored 37/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 8/30
Exploitability 7/25
Stealth signal 6/15
Affected reach 5/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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