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Low 37 Bitcoin

Remove Copy from TweakedKeypair and Keypair

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Mitchell Bagot

68/100 · Adequate
Remove Copy from TweakedKeypair and Keypair

The keypair types hold secret data. While we can't eliminate unwanted
copies of data by the compiler, we can reduce their likelihood by
eliminating Copy from the type types. According to the linting rules
this also requires some changes to conversion functions.

Remove Copy from Keypair and TweakedKeypair.
Rename to_keypair to into_keypair on Keypair.
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit removes the automatic 'Copy' trait from two Bitcoin key types that hold secret data (Keypair and TweakedKeypair). In Rust, 'Copy' makes it easy for the compiler to silently duplicate values, which can increase the chances of secret key material being copied around in memory unexpectedly. The change also renames a method from 'to_keypair' to 'into_keypair' and adjusts related code. It is a defensive hardening measure, not a fix for a known active exploit.

Recommended action

Treat as a defensive hardening improvement. Review downstream code that relied on implicit Copy of Keypair/TweakedKeypair, as it will now require explicit .clone() or ownership handling. Consider pairing this change with explicit zeroization or secure-memory practices if not already in place, since removing Copy alone does not prevent all secret duplication.

Security signals we found

01

Removal of Copy trait from secret-bearing types (defensive secret-handling hardening)

02

API rename from to_keypair to into_keypair to reflect consuming conversion semantics

03

Methods changed from self to &self to avoid unnecessary moves of secret-bearing values

04

No direct memory-zeroization or unsafe code changes present in diff

Risk score

Why this scored 37/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 8/30
Exploitability 5/25
Stealth signal 6/15
Affected reach 7/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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